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Institutions again have become the focus of the theorizing and empirical work of economists 
concerned with the determinants of economic growth, and of cross country differences in 
income levels. One central argument of this paper is that institutions and institutional change 
need to be understood as tightly intertwined with the technologies used in an economy, and with 
technological change. A second argument is that, in general, societies have very limited ability 
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I. Introduction 
Today these questions are among the most challenging facing professional economists, 
and also are at the heart of political and ideological controversy.  They come up in several 
different contexts.  The central challenge of development economics clearly is to illuminate the 
causal differences between the countries that were desperately poor in the 1950s, but which 
have since that time achieved quite productive and progressive economies, and those that have 
progressed hardly at all.  Many of the economies that used to be organized under a communist 
mode, but abandoned that system largely because of poor economic performance, still are 
floundering, and searching for whatever it is that lends productivity and progressiveness to at 
least some capitalist economies.  After a period of very rapid growth, in which the productivity 
and income gaps with the United States were largely closed, the economies of Western Europe 
and Japan recently have been progressing much more haltingly.  Various proposals regarding 
the reasons, and the reforms that might work, are the subject of hot political debates in these 
countries.  In the United States, after the doldrums of the 1970s and 1980s, the growth surge of 
the late 1990s rekindled an earlier strong self-confidence that Americans knew the secret of 
economic progress. However, the last several years have renewed some doubts about that 
matter. 
The current vogue, both among professional economists, and in the public argument, is 
to see “the right institutions” as the basic answer to the first question. This contemporary focus 
on institutions comes as the result of a long intellectual journey through which modern 
economists, interested in understanding the sources of productivity differences across nations, 
and the processes of economic growth, gradually have broadened and deepened their analysis. 
(See Nelson, 1998, and Abramovitz, 1989, for details on this intellectual history). 
 Thus in the early years after World War II, the gap between high income, high 
productivity, economies, and poor ones, was seen as largely the consequence of differences in 
the stocks of physical and human capital, and investment seen as the key to advancing 
economic performance. There were obvious differences between advanced and less developed 
countries in terms of their command over modern technologies, but the problem of “technology 
transfer” was seen as not particularly difficult, if the needed investments were made. However, it 
soon became clear that command over technologies was not that easy to achieve, and involved 
much more than simply investments in physical and human capital. Thus while the communist 
block countries were marked by high rates of investment in both physical and human capital, by 
the late 1970s it was clear that productivity in most of their industries was low, and that they 
lacked abilities to produce high quality products. Attention began to focus on the features of   2
national economies that seemed to underlie technological capabilities, particularly the incentives 
and competences of the organizations responsible for production. With the rapid rise of Japan 
as an economic and technological power, economists and other scholars began to look more 
closely at differences across countries in the way that business organizations were structured 
and managed, and at the financial and labor market systems supporting them, and these 
variables came to be added to the list of factors viewed as influencing economic productivity 
and progressiveness. As Japan stumbled in the early 1990s, and as biotech and IT firms 
boomed in the United States, the attention of economists shifted from large stable firms, to start-
ups and connections between firms and universities, from patient finance to venture capital, and 
from employment regimes that involved long run mutual commitments, to more fluid labor 
market arrangements. During this same period, an extensive literature grew up focused on 
“National Innovation Systems” (see e.g. Nelson, 1993), which further broadened the focus, with 
firms viewed as being imbedded in and supported by a variety of non-market organizations and 
programs, for example universities funded by government to undertake research and training in 
fields relevant to an industry. 
Each of these developments shows economists trying to broaden or deepen their 
analysis of the factors influencing economic productivity and progressiveness, by looking into 
matters of economic organization and other forces shaping the capabilities and behavior of 
economic actors. During the 1980s and 1990s many economists began to generalize this quest 
for more basic understanding, and “institutions” came to be used as the term to characterize the 
fundamental factors shaping economic productivity, and progressiveness. North, 1990, was 
perhaps the most forceful contemporary spokesman for the new interest in institutions, but there 
were many others.  
In a very real sense, the renewed interest of economists in institutions is a coming home 
to old traditions. Economic institutions, or entities that modern economists might call that, were 
a central interest of Adam Smith, and the classical tradition that followed him. Indeed, it was 
only in the second half of the twentieth century that the main line of economics began to take a 
position that the science of economics ought to be as “institutions free” as possible, or at least to 
focus on general market systems without getting tangled up in particular institutional details. It is 
good that we now are again talking seriously about institutions.  But it is less clear we really 
understand what we are talking about.    
Getting at the second question, “What are the needed institutions?” is a tough task. It is 
important to recognize that the analytic problem of even making sense of institutions involves a 
somewhat different kind of theorizing than that contained in standard growth theory. Many years   3
ago Moses Abramovitz (1952) called attention to the difference between what he called the 
“immediate” sources of growth, and causation at a deeper level. Using his language, the 
advance of physical and human capital, and total factor productivity, more generally the 
variables in a growth accounting are “immediate” sources of economic growth. The deeper 
question is what lies behind these variables. It is clear that “institutions” presently is the name 
many economists give to these deeper causes.  
The position I want to argue in this essay is that the current consensus that “institutions” 
are the key is a bit like the recognition; half a century ago, that “growth of total factor 
productivity” was the principal “immediate” source of economic growth.  At that time, while some 
economists interpreted this variable as a measure of technological advance, it seemed likely to 
other economists that a number of factors were involved. Abramovitz (1956) called it “a 
measure of our ignorance.”  In any case, it was clear that the variables that economists felt they 
understood pretty well that were included in neoclassical growth theory simply were not up to 
the task of explaining most of growth, or differences across nations in productivity levels.  
Calling the residual “growth of total factor productivity” gave it a name. But it has taken many 
years and much research for economists to get a decent grip on technological advance and 
other significant components of total factor productivity. And the factors behind the “immediate” 
sources of growth still are not well understood.  
  Indeed, this is an important part of the reason for the current focus on institutions. But 
we have not made much headway yet on making the term a useful analytical concept. 
There are three kinds of questions about “institutions,” and their roles in determining 
economic productivity and progressiveness, that in my view are wide open.   
There is, first of all, the question: what are institutions?  These days many scholars of 
institutions propose that institutions should be understood as “the basic rules of the game,” the 
broad legal regime and the way it is enforced, widely held norms that constrain behavior, etc. 
(North, 1990).  But other scholars associate institutions with particular governing structures 
molding aspects of economic activity, like a nation’s financial “institutions,” or the way firms tend 
to be organized and managed (see e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1985). While this conception is not 
radically inconsistent with the notion that institutions are the rules of the game, it is not quite the 
same. Still other social scientists associate the term institutions with customs, standard and 
expected patterns of behavior in particular contexts, like the acceptance of money in exchange 
for goods and services. (Veblen, 1999 and later, is the canonical reference here. Among 
contemporary economists, Hodgson, 1988, 2006, is the strongest advocate for a Veblenian 
perspective). The conception here is with the ways things are done, rather than broad rules or   4
governing structures that constrain behavior; although these things are connected, they are 
somewhat different. Also, while many authors use the term “institution” to refer to somewhat 
abstract variables, like the consistency and justice of the rule of law in a society, or the general 
use of money in exchange, other scholars associate the term with particular concrete entities, 
as the Supreme Court of the United States, or the Federal Reserve System.   
This is a very heterogeneous bag of things that are being called institutions. It is 
apparent, it seems to me, that presently many economists are using the term “institutions” 
largely as a “place holder,” just as we used “total factor productivity” as a place holder some 
years ago.  And just as in the earlier case progress in understanding required the explicit 
recognition of several different variables and processes; my bet is that the same will be required 
before we get a useful grip on the “institutions” bestiary. 
  Then there are, second, questions about the relationships between institutions and 
economic productivity and progressiveness. In much of the contemporary writings by 
economists, it is almost taken for granted that modern economies need to be largely structured 
through markets, and that good institutions support the effective operation of such an economy.  
But it is not clear that economists presently have a good conception of what “effective 
operation” of a “market” economy involves, particularly if the performance we are trying to 
understand involves economic growth, which virtually all scholars recognize as being largely 
driven by innovation.  As Schumpeter (1934, 1942) argued long ago, the standard neoclassical 
theory of market organization and behavior is not capable of dealing with the phenomena of 
innovation. It also is clear that, once one pays attention to the activities that support innovation, 
a number of non-market organizations (like universities, and Government R and D support 
programs) are involved, as well as market organizations. There is the task, therefore, of 
developing a theory of innovation driven economic growth, and the activities involved, that 
recognizes the key roles played by non-market structures as well as those conventionally seen 
as market ones.   
And finally, there is the question about how institutional change comes about, and how 
the society that would benefit from a different set of institutions can manage to put these in 
place.  There are a variety of different theories of institutional change, some proposing that 
institutions “evolve” in some sense, and some proposing that institutions are consciously chosen 
in some way. But in any case, it is clear that, even if we knew just what kind of institutions were 
needed to enhance economic productivity and progressiveness, building and sustaining those 
institutions is a real challenge.   5
  These big questions will be the topics explored in the following three sections of this 
paper. My argument in Section II is that the conglomerate of things different economists have 
called institutions largely reflects the fact that many different kinds of structures and forces mold 
the way individuals and organizations interact to get things done, what Sampat and I (Nelson 
and Sampat, 2001) have called “social technologies”. Some institutions and the social 
technologies they support have broad and pervasive influence; others are sector or activity 
specific. From this point of view, it is a mistake to search for a small set of institutions that are 
necessary and sufficient for economic productivity and progress. Many different institutions are 
needed, and the institutions that are effective are very context dependent. 
Section III develops the argument that economic growth involves the co-evolution of 
technologies and the institutions needed for their effective operation and advancement. Some 
institutions provide the broad background conditions under which technological can proceed, 
and others come into existence and develop to support the important new technologies that are 
driving growth. Section IV is concerned with the processes of institutional change. A principal 
argument is that institutional change, and its influence on economic activity is much more 
difficult to direct and control than technological change, and hence prevailing institutions often 
are drags on economic productivity and progressiveness.  
In Section V, I consider the evolution of technology and institutions in pharmaceutical 
biotech, a case that illustrates nicely in concrete form many of the general arguments I have 
developed. I conclude with a summing up and a looking forward. 
 
II.  Unpacking the Concept of Institutions 
Above I remarked on the wide variety of meanings that different economists, and other 
social scientists, have given to the term “institutions,” from the rules of the game that influence 
behavior, to governing structures that make or enforce rules, to customary behavior patterns 
themselves.  Writers on institutions also differ in the extent to which they use the term to refer to 
broad, somewhat abstract things, like legal and moral protection of private property rights, or 
more concrete things, like the details of patent law in a country. Some writers on institutions see 
these as variables whose influence on economic activity is pervasive. Others use the term to 
refer to things that are specific to particular economic sectors; thus the publicly financed 
agricultural experimentation station system has been identified as a key institution behind the 
high productivity of American agriculture (see e.g. Ruttan and Hayami, 1984).   6
  Certainly we have a wide range of “things” here.  This diversity of meanings, and analytic 
foci, makes coherent discussion about the nature and role of institutions difficult.  Indeed, it can 
lead to some rather bizarre arguments. 
  Thus in 2004, two articles on institutions and economic development were published in 
the Journal of Economic Growth, one by Rodrik, Subramamian, and Trebbi, and the other by 
Glaeser, Porta, Lopez-de-Silames, and Shleifer.  The first of these articles proposed that 
differences in the “quality of institutions” are the primary variable behind the very significant 
differences in gross domestic product per worker that one finds in the modern world.  The 
authors take a broad macro view of what institutions are tying these to the clarity and strength of 
property rights and the rule of law.  The “measures” of the quality of institutions used in their 
cross-country regression purport to give indicators of this.  In contrast, the second paper 
proposes that it is investment in human capital, rather than “institutions,” that is the principal 
explanation behind cross-country differences in per capital income, and the extent to which 
economies, initially far behind the frontier, have closed the gap over the last forty years.  The 
authors propose that while government policies had a lot to do with investments made in human 
capital, the policies were relatively independent of a nation’s basic institutions, which they 
defined in terms of whether the political regimes were democratic or autocratic. 
  There are several striking things about this argument.  First, both sets of authors see 
institutions as broad structures with pervasive impacts on economic activity. Their perspective is 
that of macroeconomics.  But on the other hand, while Rodrik and colleagues focus on property 
rights and the rule of law, Glaeser and colleagues take a view that the term institutions refers to 
the form of government.  It would seem that the authors of the articles in question are talking 
past each other. 
  The recent book Imperfect Institutions, written by Thrainn Eggertsson (2005) stands in 
sharp contrast to both of these macro oriented analyses. Eggertsson is interested in the same 
broad question as the authors of the two articles cited above: the determinants of economic 
development.  He also is focused on “institutions” as the key variable.  In his general discussion 
of what institutions are and how they mold economic behavior Eggertsson considers both rules 
and norms, and political processes and machinery, an eclectic position I too will espouse. 
However, and here too my position is similar to his, Eggertsson clearly believes that, to be 
useful, analysis of how institutions affect economic growth and productivity needs to get into the 
details of how institutions affect behavior. He develops this part of his analysis largely in 
analysis of how “institutions” affected the development of the fishing industry in Iceland, in the 
earlier era strongly constraining it, and then later changing to encourage and support it.  A   7
reader cannot help but come away from reading Eggertsson’s fascinating analysis with an 
understanding that broad definitions of what institutions are and general statements about what 
they do cannot carry us very far. 
  If the research by individual economists and other social scientists on the nature and 
role of institutions in long run economic development is to go forward in a way that is coherent 
and cumulative, there clearly needs to be more shared agreement regarding just what the term 
“institutions” is presumed to mean, and how they affect economic activity. The position I want to 
espouse here is that the most useful conception of what institutions are would encompass a 
wide range of somewhat different things, but with different ones relevant in different analytical 
contexts. The unity and focus of the research program would be provided by agreement on what 
institutions broadly do. 
  Bhaven Sampat and I have proposed (Nelson and Sampat, 2001) that, despite the 
diversity in the literature regarding how institutions are defined, a large share of the writing is 
intended to illuminate the factors molding the goal oriented behaviors of economic agents in 
contexts where the actions of several parties determine what is achieved. The authors generally 
take the position that the simple lean theory contained in standard microeconomics of the forces 
determining modes of transacting, economic interacting more generally, leaves out important 
constraints, pressures, and mechanisms, and introduce the concept of “institutions” to fill in the 
gaps they see, or in some cases to provide a quite different theory of the determinants of 
behavior. The objective of virtually all of the authors is to use the concept of institutions to 
provide a better explanation of why models of interactive behavior of economic agents differs 
across countries and over time in ways that profoundly affect the effectiveness of economic 
activity. The different concepts of institutions that one finds in the literature partly reflects the 
particular economic phenomena the authors are focusing on, including whether the phenomena 
are broad and pervasive or more specific to particular sectors and activities, partly the particular 
“institution” they are analyzing, and partly where they choose to apply the “institutions” term in 
the chain of logic they are proposing. 
  Sampat and I proposed that the concept of a “social technology” was a useful one for 
making more coherent the writings about institutions. Our social technologies concept involved 
a broadening of the way economists think about an economic “activity”.  
In its standard use in economics, an activity is thought of as a way of producing 
something, or more generally doing something useful; Sampat and I take a broad view of what 
the term encompasses. Undertaking an activity or a set of them – producing a radio, growing 
rice, performing a surgery, baking a cake, procuring a needed item, starting a new business –   8
involves a set of actions or procedures that need to be done, for example as specified in a 
recipe for the preparation of a cake. These steps or procedures may require particular inputs 
(like flour and sugar for the cake, cash or a credit card to procure the ingredients for the cake), 
and perhaps some equipment (something to stir, a stove, a vehicle to go to the store). 
Economists are prone to use the term “technology” to denote the procedures that need to be 
done to get the desired result.  
However, a recipe characterization of what needs to be done represses the fact that 
many economic activities involve multiple actors, and require some kind of a coordinating 
mechanism to assure that the various aspects of the recipe are performed in the relationships to 
each other needed to make the recipe work. The standard notion of a recipe is mute about how 
this is done. Sampat and I proposed that it might be useful to call the recipe aspect of an activity 
its “physical” technology, and the way work is divided and coordinated its “social” technology.  
  From this perspective, virtually all economic activities involve the use of both physical 
technologies and social technologies. The productivity or effectiveness of an activity is 
determined by both aspects.  
The social technologies concept does not include all of the kinds of behavior that at least 
some of the writings on institutions appear to want to encompass, but I propose that it does 
include a large part of the spectrum most relevant to analysis of economic productivity and 
progressiveness. The “technology” part of the term denotes behaviors that are intended to get 
something accomplished; the “social” part denotes that those behaviors involve or are 
responsive to the actions or expected actions of multiple agents.  
I would include under the social technologies umbrella both behaviors associated with 
getting things done within an organization, and actions to get things done involving two or more 
separate individuals or organizations. Behaviors associated with market activity – for example 
individuals or individual organizations acting to achieve their ends through buying from or selling 
to sometimes anonymous others – would be included. A practice of only transacting with people 
you know well because only they can be trusted, or of not doing any transacting involving 
money on holy days because of the force of public opinion, would under my proposed umbrella 
concept be considered as an aspect of the social technologies employed in a society. More 
generally, the social technologies concept is meant to encompass those aspects of goal 
oriented ways of doing things, where the behavior of agents is tailored to or intended to 
influence the expected actions or reactions of other agents.  
From this point of view, the social technologies that are employed in an economy are 
enabled and constrained by things like laws, norms, expectations, governing structures and   9
mechanisms, customary modes of transacting and interacting. All of these tend to support and 
standardize certain social technologies, and make others difficult or infeasible in a society. 
Sampat and I suggested that, where these exist, standardized social technologies, the prevalent 
modes of interacting for getting done particular things in a society, are what much of the writings 
on institutions is about.  
As I have noted, some economists use the term institutions to refer to what they regard 
as the major influences shaping such social technologies, while others use the term to refer to 
prevalent social technologies themselves. While the linguistic distinction is clear, and one might 
think that in practice there ought to be clean lines between these two conceptions of what 
institutions are, in practice the two conceptions sometimes shade into each other. Some ways of 
doing things have the support and coercion of strong custom. A good example is the use of 
money for procuring various kinds of things, which would seem to be at once a social 
technology when viewed as a goal oriented behavior, and an institution when viewed as a 
custom. At the same time, behind the social technology and custom of using money to acquire 
things lie a body of law, and a structure of financial institutions, that in many societies make this 
practice not only possible but easy and safe to employ. In turn, these institutions are supported 
by prevalent beliefs and norms in a society regarding the appropriateness of market 
transactions, the importance of honesty, and the like. 
More generally, I want to argue that the institutions molding and supporting social 
technologies come in layers or concentric circles. Some are tied so closely to the practices in 
question that one cannot be considered without the other. Others are more removed. An 
important difference between economists who consider institutions as macro-economic factors, 
and those who study behavior at a more detailed level, is that the former generally do not see 
the institutions that are “close in,” as it were, to particular ways of doing things, while the latter 
often do.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that economists who take a macroeconomic approach tend 
to think of institutions as factors that influence the social technologies that are operative in a 
society, but do not strictly determine them. Societies clearly have a degree of control over 
institutions like the formal structure of laws, and formal organizational designs and designated 
authority relationships. However, these kinds of institutions may determine only relatively 
broadly the social technologies that actually are employed. There remains considerable room 
for variation in the prevalent habits of action and thought that scholars like Veblen defined as 
institutions. And it is these patterns of actual behavior, the social technologies that are 
prevalent, that directly influence economic performance.   10
  I propose that explicit recognition of the concept of a social technology, together with 
understanding that a variety of different factors influence which social technologies customarily 
are employed in a particular context, helps to illuminate why the term “institution” has been used 
to cover so many apparently disparate things. My proposed approach is to focus on the 
prevalent social technologies and be eclectic and inclusive about the “institutions” that support 
them. As I have suggested, and will show in the examples developed in the following sections, 
there generally will be a number of different “institutions” that support and constrain particular 
social technologies, and they operate in different ways. Some institutions have a broad and 
somewhat diffuse affect on the social technologies that are used or not used. Thus the influence 
of “respect for the rule of law” is largely atmospheric, affecting broadly a wide range of economic 
activities and the social technologies used in them. Other institutions are more specific to the 
particular social technologies under study. Thus each of the cases considered later involves 
particular governing structures and particular laws. Some institutions provide the background 
context within which the particular social technologies under study evolve. Others change as an 
essential part of the evolutionary process. 
My proposed eclectic approach is somewhat at tension with the gravitation in recent 
years of economists writing about institutions to go along with the “rules of the game” definition, 
broadly defined. I find the rules of the game notion about what institutions are attractive in that it 
avoids suggesting that institutions determine behaviors strictly.  However, I resist that pull 
because the range of particular “things” that reasonably are called institutions under my 
proposed definition contains many that can be characterized only very partially in terms of a set 
of rules, for example the form of government, or the operative financial system, or (to give some 
examples I will discuss in detail in the following section) the modern corporate organizational 
form, or the industrial research laboratory.  Of course if one adopts a broad enough definition of 
what can be considered a “rule,” as Hodgson (2006) does in a recent article, I have no trouble 
with the notion that all institutions define rules. But I question then whether this language usage 
is particularly helpful. 
I have similar remarks on the apparent broad acceptance of the notion that institutions, 
as the rules of the game, form constraints on behavior. In many cases new institutions would 
seem to open up productive new ways of doing things. While the pathways they make possible 
are usually limited in some respects, to see the new institutions only as constraints takes 
attention away from the fact that they support the use of new social technologies. Thus the 
emergence of the modern corporate form, and the industrial research laboratory, permitted   11
things to be done productively that were impossible or badly hindered under the older set of 
institutions. 
Some writers want to make a clean distinction between institutions and organizations. 
However, under the conception I propose, broadly accepted organizing principles, to use a term 
employed by Bruce Kogut (1993, 2000, Kogut and Zander 1992) would definitely be considered 
a part of the institutional environment, even if particular extant organizations embodying those 
principles might not (but then what about the Bank of England?). I note that Kogut makes a 
distinction between organizing principles which, in my language, may be close in to particular 
social technologies, and institutions that influence what organizational principles are accepted 
as legitimate within a society, and which are not. This is quite consistent with my proposition 
that institutions come in layers. 
  Some institutions, for examples laws bearing on particular activities are, in a sense, 
external to social technologies, and mold them. However, social technologies also can be self-
institutionalized, if I may use that term. This is an important reason why the lines often are 
blurred between a prevalent practice and the “institutional” supports for that practice.  
Social technologies can be self institutionalized in several ways. First, customary 
behaviors, modes of interacting, organizing, tend to be self reinforcing because they are 
expected, and familiar, and doing something different may require going against the grain. 
Second, social technologies tend to exist in systems, with one tuned to another, and self 
supporting. This may make going against the grain in one social technology especially difficult, 
because it involves losing touch with complementary social technologies. Third, social 
technologies, like physical technologies, tend to progress over time, as experience is 
accumulated, and shared deliberately or inadvertently. Trying a new social technology, like 
pioneering a new physical technology, is risky, and involves abandoning the fruits of what may 
be considerable prior experience. I note that these forces of self institutionalization are important 
reasons why a society’s ability to control the social technologies in use through conscious 
designing of institutions may be limited. 
  Institutions clearly have a certain stability. Yet economic growth, as we have 
experienced it, clearly has seen old social technologies fade away, sometimes abruptly 
sometimes slowly, and replaced by new ones. It is time to explore more deeply the role of 
institutions and institutional change in the process of economic growth.   12
    
III.  Institutions and Economic Growth 
Before getting into the roles of institutions and institutional change in economic growth, I 
need to characterize the economic growth process more broadly. I want to begin by baldly 
asserting that economic growth must be understood as an evolutionary process driven by 
innovation. Hardly any contemporary economist would have trouble with the second part of this 
proposition, about innovation being the key driving force in economic growth. The first part is 
somewhat more controversial, and many contemporary economic growth models assume 
something close to a moving general equilibrium. However, as Schumpeter (1934, 1948) argued 
long ago, one simply cannot comprehend innovation within an analytic framework that assumes 
that economic actors have a good understanding of the consequences of innovating, or not 
innovating for that matter, and that the system as a whole is in continuing equilibrium. 
Schumpeter’s discussion of innovation, of course, took off from his base discussion of a 
circular flow of economic activity, wherein each economic agent did the customary thing, 
supported in his or her actions by the customary actions of other economic agents. 
Schumpeter’s discussion of the circular flow was his way of articulating what was going on in a 
Walrasian general equilibrium, although his stress was on the customary patterns of behavior in 
such a context, rather than that the actions of each agent were optimal for that agent, given 
what the others were doing. But in any case, in such a general equilibrium, while economic 
agents may face some risk in taking the action they deem appropriate in the context, in the 
sense that they do not know for sure if it will rain or not, there is no Knightian uncertainty 
regarding what can happen or what is, on average, best to do. 
For Schumpeter, such a pattern of activity was exactly what was not going on in an 
economy where innovation was proceeding at a reasonable clip. Innovators are trying 
something new, and the consequences of their actions will depend on how effectively they do 
something they have not done before, and also on how others react. In such a context, there is 
no empirically rational basis for assigning probabilities to possible outcomes, much less being 
able even to conceive all the possibilities. If considerable innovation is going on, the non 
innovators also face real uncertainty, regarding how they will fare, or even regarding whether 
their traditional actions will be viable, in the face of the innovation of others. What actually 
happens will benefit some, and punish others; those who are hurt may need to rethink what they 
should be doing. Economic growth driven by innovation thus involves essentially the “creative 
destruction” of older ways of doing things, and, often, of economic agents who were good at 
those older ways but cannot or are slow to adopt the new.  If innovation stops, the pattern of   13
economic activity may settle down into a new general equilibrium. But if innovation is continuing, 
which it is under virtually all theories of economic growth, the economy in motion is always at 
least somewhat out of equilibrium. 
Innovators, in competition with each other, and with prevailing practice, cannot know ex-
ante whether they will be winners or losers, nor can those who choose to stay with prevailing 
practice. Winners and losers, both ways of doing things, and economic agents, will be 
determined ex-post by the competition. This is exactly the position of modern evolutionary 
growth theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The question that obviously needs to be considered next, given the objectives of this 
paper is “Where are institutions in the above story?” 
One can see institutions, if implicitly, in Schumpeter’s theory of customary behavior in 
the circular flow. In his writings Schumpeter highlighted that behaviors in the circular flow were 
mutually supporting and constraining. Under the conception of institutions as forces holding 
patterns of interactive behaviors in place, these expectations, norms, and hazards of deviating 
from the established pattern of activity, that Schumpeter associated with equilibrium certainly 
are institutions. And it would not be hard to enrich Schumpeter’s analysis to include as shaping 
factors things like laws, the way the financial system worked, etc. Indeed, much of the current 
writings about institutions is exactly oriented to identifying the forces molding equilibrium 
behavior.  
I want to propose, however, that Schumpeter draws the distinction between behavior in 
a static equilibrium and in a dynamic disequilibrium too sharply. Continuing innovation in a field 
often has its own regularities, and behavior can be tuned to these. Indeed, for progress to be 
sustained, there probably must be such tuning. Put in the context of this essay, particular 
institutions often are needed to support the kind of continuing fruitful interaction that sustains 
innovation in a field and makes it productive. 
But while stable institutions may be possible, in some cases even necessary, in a regime 
where physical technologies are advancing briskly, a look at the historical record shows clearly 
that institutional change is an integral aspect of the processes of long run economic 
development. New forms of business organization arise, businesses take on board new 
activities, and some old forms and activities fade away. New markets get developed, and some 
old ones disappear.  I note that Schumpeter’s conception of innovation was broad, including 
new “social technologies” like the above, as well as technological innovation more narrowly 
defined. Economic development as we have experienced it also has seen the emergence and   14
development of new non-market organizations, new professions, and new laws. All of this is 
institutional change, as I have broadly defined the term.  
These observations of course lead to the question of just how institutional change is 
connected with other aspects of the economic development. Several economists, Vernon 
Ruttan (2001, Ruttan and Hayami, 1984) and Douglass North ( 1990, 1999) prominent among 
them, have argued that changes in economic conditions associated with development often 
make established ways of transacting, interacting, organizing, social technologies in the 
language I am using, more costly and less advantageous, and call for new social technologies. 
In turn these often require the development of new institutions. Ruttan in particular has argued 
for a theory of induced institutional innovation. 
Following the lines I have proposed earlier, I want to argue that, while sometimes the 
coupling is tight and sometimes looser, changed social technologies and changed physical 
technologies generally go together. Sometimes change in both is induced by changed economic 
conditions. However, as Schumpeter had argued, in modern economies efforts at innovation 
have a drive of their own.  In any case, the argument I want to develop in the remainder of this 
section is that innovation driven economic growth needs to be understood as involving the co-
evolution of physical and social technologies, and that the dynamics of institutional change 
should be seen from that point of view.  
Of course the notion that physical and social technologies are tied together is an old one 
in social science. Karl Marx proposed a very tight linkage, with the causal structure running 
cleanly from physical technologies to the social technologies of production. There is an 
extensive literature in sociology on how changes in physical technologies affect the organization 
and social order of economic activity. Below I briefly describe two historical episodes that nicely 
illustrate the dynamic connections: the rise of mass production in the United States in the last 
part of the 19
th century, and the development of the first science based industry – synthetic 
dyestuffs – in Germany during roughly the same period. 
Alfred Chandler’s work (1962, 1977) is central to my telling of the first story. Under his 
analysis, the processes that led to mass production in a range of industries were initiated by the 
development of the telegraph and the railroad, which made it possible for business firms to 
market their products over a much larger geographical area. At the same time advances were 
being made in the ability to design and build highly productive machinery. Together, these 
developments opened the possibility for significant economies of scale and scope.  
However, to exploit these opportunities, firms had to be much larger than had been the 
norm, and large size posed significant problems of both organization and management. The   15
organizational problem was partly solved by the emergence of the modern hierarchically-
organized company, and later by the multidivisional form of organization (the M form).  But to 
manage these huge companies required many more high level managers than an owner could 
garner by canvassing family and friends, which had been the usual practice.  The notion of 
professional management came into being, and shortly after business schools emerged as the 
institutional mechanism for training professional managers.  The financial needs of the giant 
companies were beyond what could be met through existing financial institutions, and both 
modern investment banks, and modern stock markets, emerged to meet the needs. 
  All of these developments raised complicated issues of corporate, labor, and financial, 
law.  Gradually these were worked out.  At the same time, the market power of the new large 
firms and their tendency to collude with each other gave rise to new regulatory law and antitrust. 
  Peter Murmann (2003) provides the most detailed and analytic account of the rise of the 
industry producing synthetic dyestuffs. Here the initiating event was a breakthrough in the 
science of organic chemistry.  As a result, persons with advanced training in the theory and 
techniques of chemistry had a special capability for developing synthetic dyestuffs.  In order to 
take advantage of this new capability, business firms had to develop the concept and structure 
of the industrial research laboratory, as a place where university-trained scientists could work 
with their peers in discovering and developing new products.  German patent law was tightened 
up better enabling German firms to protect the new dyestuffs they created. Also, in the new 
regime involving hired scientists, new law also had to be developed to establish who had patent 
rights on products coming out of the labs.  
And the German university system had to gear itself up to train significant numbers of 
chemists inclined to work for industry.  The various German governments provided significant 
funding to enable this latter development to happen. 
In both of these cases one can see clearly the intertwining of the development of new 
physical technologies, and the emergence and development of new social technologies. The 
former required significant investments in new physical capital, and in the case of dyestuffs, 
human capital. Employment of the new social technologies involved new expectations and 
norms, new ways of organizing and governing work, in some cases new laws, and new 
government programs, more generally new institutions. 
Various aspects of the broad institutional environment clearly were necessary for the 
innovations that drove developments in these two cases to proceed effectively. First of all, the 
economic and social cultures had to encourage entrepreneurship, and the risk taking that is 
inevitable when new activities are launched. The relevant “institutions” here probably mostly   16
involved norms, and expectations, although the legal system had to such that potential 
entrepreneurs could expect to get rich if they succeeded. 
Second, in both cases developments involved sharp breaks from the “circular flow” of 
economic activity, and finance needed to be available to support new firms doing new things. It 
would appear that in both of these cases, a lot of that early money came from rich individuals. 
As large scale industry became more common, in both countries investment banks became 
more prominent, and in the United States the modern stock market began to develop. Again, the 
supporting institutions involved a mix of norms and expectations, laws providing some security 
for investors, and appropriate organizational structures.  
And labor market institutions had to be compatible with new firms being able to attract 
workers with suitable skills.  In both of these cases, the development of the new industry saw 
demand for people with high levels of training, and the emergence of new professions, 
professional managers in the one case, and industrial chemists in the other. For rapid 
development of these industries to proceed, the universities in the countries had to be, and 
were, responsive to these new demands. In the German case, this involved as well a significant 
increase in government funding of universities.  
Many of the institutional changes that were made occurred largely as a result of private 
actions, but a number required collective action, generally involving government and the political 
process. I have just mentioned the increases in public monies that went to support chemistry at 
German universities. Earlier I mentioned several other areas where old law was modified, or 
new law created.  
Note that institutions enter these stories in two ways. First, as background preconditions 
that enable the developments to arise in the first place and take the shape they did. Here the 
relevant institutions tend to be associated with broad economy-wide context conditions, like a 
legal system that defines and enforces contracts, a financial system capable of funding new 
enterprises, flexible labor markets, and in the dyestuffs case, a strong university research 
system. Economists doing macroeconomic analysis tend to focus on institutions like these.  
But second, as the case studies show, the dynamics of development often require old 
institutions to change or new ones to emerge. Here the institutions in our stories are more 
technology or industry specific, like bodies of law tailored to a technology or industry, or the 
development of university research and training in particular fields. These are the kinds of 
institutions that economists analyzing the dynamics of particular sectors or activities tend to 
focus on.    17
As I have written up these two case studies, an advance in a physical technology or a 
science is treated as the initiating cause of a process in which physical and social technologies 
co-evolve. But if I had started my accounts earlier in time, a developing social technology might 
have appeared to be the instigator. Thus the great size of the U.S. market that made the 
installation of railroads and telephone lines so attractive to investors and public officials was the 
result of the customs built into the expanding American population to move on to new open 
land, and of the political structure and processes built into the American political system that led 
to polices that encouraged and supported such movement. German universities were the site of 
the development of organic chemistry as a powerful new science as a result of earlier German 
policies, and a supporting philosophy, which encouraged the rise of the research university, a 
development that occurred earlier in German than in other countries. It is at least as much the 
case that the institutional background molds the development of physical technologies, as it is 
the case that the development of new physical technologies cause institutions to change. 
Earlier I noted that many of contemporary writers attempting to describe effective 
institutions have proposed that economies are productive and progressive when institutions 
support market mechanisms. In both of the cases sketched above, one can see the central role 
market organization of economic activity plays in fostering productivity and progressiveness.  
However, the advantages of market organization, and the disadvantages of trying to plan and 
control economic development from a central authority, are not those highlighted by the 
neoclassical theory of market organization and its virtues.  It is the fundamental uncertainties 
involved in innovation, the inability of economic actors to see clearly the best things to be doing, 
that make the pluralism, the competition that is associated with market organization of economic 
activity so important.  Competition also often tends to keep prices from getting completely out of 
line with costs.  But as Schumpeter argued long ago, by far the principal benefit that society 
gets from market organization of economic activity, and competition, is innovation and economic 
progress. 
Also, non-market institutions play key roles in both of these case studies. As I argued 
earlier, it is a mistake to see the advance of physical technologies as being influenced only by 
market institutions and mechanisms. Many important social technologies involve essential non-
market elements 
  My discussion above has focused on particular technologies and industries, rather than 
the economy as a whole. However, as Schumpeter argued long ago, economic growth cannot 
be understood adequately as an undifferentiated aggregated phenomenon. Rather, one needs 
to understand an economy as consisting of many different sectors, each with its own dynamics.   18
Schumpeter also argued that the history of economic growth tends to divide into different eras, 
and that within any particular era there is a relatively small set of technologies and industries 
that are driving economic growth. From this point of view, the Chandler and Murmann stories 
are particularly interesting because mass production undertaken by large hierarchical firms, and 
industrial R and D tied to firms engaged in production and marketing, are the hallmarks 
(sometimes combined and sometimes not) of the industries that drove economic growth in the 
advanced industrial nations during the first two thirds of the 20
th century.  
  Carlotta Perez and Christopher Freeman (1988, and Freeman and Louca, Part II, 2001) 
have proposed that the key technologies and institutions of different eras generally require 
different sets of supporting institutions. The countries that are successful are those that have the 
basis of these institutions already in place when they are needed, or which manage to build the 
appropriate new institutions quickly and well.  The large internal market of the United States 
clearly provided a very favorable environment for the rise of mass production, but the prevailing 
institutional environment and the rapid development of new institutions tailored to the needs of 
mass production certainly also was a force behind U.S. leadership in this area.  Murmann and 
other have argued persuasively that the existing strong university research system in Germany, 
and the ability to support its expansion in chemistry, was a principal reason why German 
industry led the world in dyestuffs, and later in organic chemical products more generally, at 
least up until World War II. 
  The argument that rapid economic progress in different eras requires different sets of 
particular supporting institutions is not to deny the broader point of view, associated with an 
evolutionary or Schumpeterian view of the general nature of economic progress, that to support 
innovation and take advantage of its potential fruits the institutions of an economy need to be 
supportive of entrepreneurship, broadly defined, and enable resources to be shifted from rising 
economic sectors and firms to declining ones. But it does suggest strongly that those 
generalizations cannot carry the analysis very far. Rather, analysis of the institutions required 
for economic productivity and progress must get into the details, which inevitably are going to 
differ from sector to sector and era to era. 
 
IV.  The Processes of Institutional Change 
How do a country’s institutions come to be what they are? To what extent can salutary 
institutional reform be subject to deliberate analysis, planning, and implementation? 
There is a longstanding divide about these issues in the writings of institutional 
economists.  In the early part of the twentieth century, John R. Commons (1924, 1934), focusing   19
on the evolution of the law, staked out a position that to a considerable extent the institutions 
that a society had were the ones it had deliberately put in place, wisely or not.  Frederick 
Hayek’s theory (1967, 1973) of why societies had the institutions that they had was different, 
stressing “private orders” that changed over time through a relatively blind evolutionary process.  
There is a similar divide among the “new institutional economists” regarding this matter.  Indeed, 
Douglass North himself has taken both views, starting from a position that institutions were the 
result of a deliberate, rational choice processes (Davis and North, 1971), and later moving to a 
position very similar to Hayek’s (North, 1990, 1999): that institutions could not be effectively 
planned, and that the societies that had good ones should regard themselves as fortunate. 
Thrainn Eggertsson has followed a similar intellectual traverse. 
Partly the difference here relates to the assumed influence and effectiveness of human 
purpose, intelligence, and forward looking planning, versus more or less random change and 
ex-post selection. Partly the difference is in regards to whether institutional change is seen as 
occurring largely through collective, generally governmental, action, or whether the process is 
seen as being largely decentralized, involving many actors. The position I espouse here is that 
on both counts the contrast often is drawn too sharply. I want to agree strongly with the 
economists and other social scientists who argue that institutions evolve rather than being 
largely planned. However, I also want to argue that beliefs about what is feasible, and what is 
appropriate, often play a major role in the evolution of institutions. Human purpose, and human 
beliefs, play an important role both in the generation of the institutional alternatives on which 
selection works, and in determining what survives and what does not.  And in many cases the 
process involves both decentralized and collective action. 
The mix of course depends on the kind of institution one is analyzing. The development 
of formal law obviously involves deliberate governmental action. Generally there is debate about 
what the law should be, and some kind of a formal decision process. On the other hand, the 
evolution of custom generally is highly decentralized and whatever conscious deliberation there 
is tends to be myopic. But, it may be a mistake to see the processes here as completely 
separated. Thus Commons noted explicitly that, particularly in common-law countries, the 
development of formal bodies of law tended to be strongly influenced by the customs of the land 
that were broadly deemed appropriate.  And Hayek too recognized that formal law often was 
developed to support custom, while warning of the dangers of putting in place formal law, or 
public policies more generally that were not based on the wisdom of custom. 
In the cases described earlier, the development of new organizational forms was an 
important part of the story. While Chandler’s account of the emergence and development of the   20
organizational structure of the modern corporation highlights innovation by individual 
companies, a body of corporate and financial law developed along with, responsive to, and 
supporting and constraining these private developments. Murmann’ account of the development 
of the modern industrial laboratory involves a mix of private experimentation and decision 
making, and the formation of laws and public programs responsive to the emergence of 
industrial research.  
While both of these cases show an evolutionary process that is sensitive to changing 
needs and conditions, I now want to argue that the process of evolution of social technologies 
and their supporting institutions is erratic, compared with the way physical technologies evolve. 
The ability to design institutions that work as planned is much more limited than the ability to 
design new physical technologies. Selection forces, including the ability of the human agents 
involved to learn from experience what works well and what doesn’t, usually are significantly 
weaker for institutions and social technologies than for physical technologies. And usually there 
is much less ability to compare alternative institutions analytically. 
One important reason is that physical technologies are more amenable to sharp 
specification and control, and are easier to replicate and imitate more or less exactly, than are 
social technologies. The performance of physical technologies, including the nature of the 
output they produce, tends to be relatively tightly constrained by the physical inputs and 
processing equipment used in their operation. On the other hand social technologies are much 
more open to the vagaries of human motivations and understandings regarding what is to be 
done, which seldom can be controlled tightly. Granovetter, 1985, has argued against the “over 
institutionalization” of theories of human behavior.  
Certainly, the institutions that can be consciously designed tend to mold behaviors only 
relatively loosely, and themselves often are difficult to specify and control tightly. Thus, it is clear 
from Chandler’s discussion of the multi-divisional form (the M form) of business organization 
that arose in the early 20
th century and became “standard” among companies producing a range 
of products and selling them in different areas, that there was very considerable variation 
among firms. The variation involved both formal structure and the actual division of decision 
making between the central office and the branches, which were only partly a matter of 
managerial choice. Indeed, there was a certain fuzziness to the general concept, and even 
individuals in the companies who were nominally in charge seem not to have known in any 
detail just how the system they had actually worked.  
A second important difference is that in most cases, not always, it is far more difficult to 
get reliable evidence on the efficacy of a new institution or social technology than for a new   21
physical technology.  In part this is a consequence of the phenomena just discussed.  For a 
company contemplating adoption, the problem of estimating the efficacy of the M-form of 
organization surely was made more difficult by the fact that what the M-form actually was and 
how it actually worked differed significantly from firm to firm, and within a particular firm tended 
to change over time.  But even without this complication, it tends to be very difficult to sort out 
the effects of a particular institution or social technology from the influences of a wide variety of 
other variables that bear on the profitability of a firm, or to estimate reliably the benefits and 
costs reaped by society from a complex of strongly interacting policies and laws.  In contrast, it 
is much easier to gain a reliable assessment of the efficacy of a new pharmaceutical, or the 
performance of a new aircraft design. 
Both of these differences are related to the fact that a lot can be learned about physical 
technologies, product designs or modes of production, by building prototypes and doing 
controlled experimentation “offline” as it were, in research and development. It is much harder to 
do this for institutions. Thomke, 2003, provides a convincing and detailed analysis of the role of 
deliberate experimentation in the design and development of physical technologies. If a physical 
technology can be made to work in a controlled setting, it often is possible to routinize and 
imbed it in physical hardware, and in this and other ways shield it from environmental influences 
that could be different on-line from experimental conditions. The looser coupling of institutions 
that can be designed and the behaviors they generate means that transfer from controlled 
setting to actual practice does not work nearly as well, even if the institution as a whole could be 
operated in an experimental setting.  
Another important differences is that, because of the ability to routinize, shield, and 
control, it often is possible to experiment with a part of a physical technology off-line, and to 
transfer an improved version of that piece to the larger system with confidence that it will work in 
that context and in actual practice. In contrast, the likelihood that a piece of an institution or 
social technology that works well in an off-line experimental setting will work well when 
imbedded in an on-line system is small. 
This is not to deny the important role of learning by doing and using regarding the 
efficacy of physical technologies. However virtually all learning regarding social technologies 
and the institutions that mold and support them has to proceed on line. And for the reasons 
suggested above, even that learning is difficult and uncertain. 
Relatedly, “scientific” understanding bearing on institutions, and indicating ways that they 
might be improved, generally is much weaker than the scientific understanding bearing on 
physical technologies.  The applications oriented natural sciences and engineering disciplines   22
often can provide very helpful illumination of prevailing practice and potential roads to 
improvement of physical technologies. They can point relatively sharply to what is essential to 
the performance of a product design, or production process, and what is likely peripheral. The 
behavioral and social sciences provide much less light on how present institutions work and 
how to improve them. In trying to understand why, it is important to recognize that the 
productive knowledge of applied scientists and engineers comes not only from the underlying 
basic sciences, but also from observation, experiment, and analysis of prevailing practices and 
artifacts, or models of these that are built expressly for experimentation and analysis. Behavioral 
and social scientists have little opportunity to build this kind of knowledge regarding institutions.  
The emergence and adoption of new social technologies can proceed rapidly and 
fruitfully if there is a reasonably well defined problem that needs some solution, one can readily 
identify a new social technology that solves that problem at least broadly, and the needed 
institutional supports for that social technology are relatively obvious. Under these conditions, 
the needed new institutions can come relatively quickly into place, at least if those who are in a 
position to make the institutional changes have an interest in doing so.  Thus in the United 
States the M form spread relatively rapidly among multi product multi market firms.  The M form 
did at least mitigate the problem of overload of decisions to be made by top management of 
such firms. The industrial research laboratory provided a way for firms to hire groups of 
scientists and put them to the task of inventing, and relatively quickly became an “institution” in 
industries where the competitiveness of firms depended on their prowess at creating new 
products and manufacturing processes.  
Vernon Ruttan (2003, 2006) has argued the case that modern societies in fact have 
considerable capacity for well directed institutional reform, based on the strength of the social 
sciences, as well as ability to learn from experience. Prominent among the examples he uses is 
the history of agricultural experimentation stations, in the U.S., in Japan, and in a number of 
today’s developing countries. The evidence of the efficacy of this institution is very strong. 
On the other hand, the history of both the M form and the industrial research laboratory 
is one of firms continuing to struggle to fine tune the structures so that they would work well in 
their particular context. I read the history of agriculture experimentation as showing the same 
sort of uncertain groping to find particular structures that work. It is illuminating to contrast the 
experience here with the evolution of mass production machinery. In the latter, many engineers 
were involved in designing machines, and getting relatively reliable information on performance 
from their own testing, and from feedback from users. Efforts to improve design could be guided   23
by user feedback and by the ability of designers to experiment off line, with reasonable 
confidence that what they learned from that experimentation would hold up in actual practice. 
And designers could learn from studying the characteristics and performance of the machines 
made by other designers. There is little evidence of anything like this progressive cumulative 
learning regarding business or research organization. The evolution of social technologies and 
the institutions that support them is a difficult uncertain process, compared with the evolution of 
physical technologies. 
My reading of the recent writings of Douglass North (1999) and Thrainn Eggertsson 
(2005) suggests that they too have come to this judgment. Of course, there are matters of 
degree here. Feedback from experience and the strength of understanding certainly are greater 
in the cases of evolution of some social technologies than for others, and for some physical 
technologies neither of these influences may be particularly strong. But my argument is that 
there are significant differences on average between physical and social technologies in these 
respects. 
  Indeed, in some circumstances institutional evolution can result in building into place 
social technologies that are quite ineffective, or worse. For the most part, evidence of the 
benefits and costs of using new physical technologies is sharp enough so that few really bad 
ones ever get into widespread use (although there unfortunately are a number of cases where 
deleterious side effects, or problems that arose in particular contexts, were discovered only after 
a technology was around for awhile). In contrast, the introduction and spread of social 
technologies can be driven by fad, or ideology, and given the difficulties in getting reliable 
feedback on actual performance, social technologies, and the institutions supporting them, once 
in place may be difficult to dislodge, even if there is little evidence that they are accomplishing 
what they were established to do.  And reform too may be driven as much by ideology as by 
solid understanding of the real problems with the existing regime.  
 
V.  The Rise of the Specialized Research Firm, and of University Patenting, in the Evolution 
of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
This section of the paper will be concerned with the evolution of institutional structures in 
the wake of the rise of biotechnology as a new technology for the development of 
pharmaceuticals. This case displays, in a contemporary setting, many of the same features we 
have seen in the two historical examples discussed earlier. And more than those earlier cases, 
this contemporary one nicely illustrates the uncertain and sometimes problematic nature of the   24
processes of institutional evolution highlighted in the previous section.  
The rise during the 1960s and 1970s of molecular biology as a strong science, and the 
creation of the basic processes used in modern biotechnology, clearly was a watershed for the 
American pharmaceutical industry.  These developments opened up a new route to 
pharmaceuticals discovery and development, one in which, at least at the start, established 
pharmaceutical companies had no particular competences, and at the same time, one where 
certain academic researchers had expertise. Several lines of university-based research began 
to appear very promising commercially.  A number of new biotech firms were formed, staffed by 
university researchers and their students, with plans to develop new pharmaceuticals, and 
either license the successful results to established pharmaceuticals companies, or themselves 
go further downstream into the pharmaceuticals business. 
  Several prevailing broad institutional factors enabled and encouraged these 
developments.  One was the traditional openness of American universities to entrepreneurial 
activity on the part of their researchers.  Another was an established venture capital industry, 
which quickly came to see the finance of biotech startups as a potentially profitable business.  
These two features of the prevailing institutional framework in the United States should be 
regarded as part and parcel of a general institutional friendliness toward entrepreneurship. 
However, the emergence of firms specializing in research, and of university researchers closely 
linked to these firms, was a quite new institutional development. (For a history see Mowery et 
al., 2005.) 
  To make this arrangement viable commercially required that the research firms have 
control over the new products and techniques they developed. Here, a key legal decision in 
1980 assured skeptics that the products of biotechnology could be patented. At about the same 
time, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which encouraged universities to take out patents on 
the results of government-funded research projects, and to try aggressively to commercialize 
those results. While the language of the act is not specifically focused on biotech, an important 
part of the argument that led Congress to believe that technology transfer from universities to 
industry would be encouraged if universities had strong patent rights and could grant exclusive 
licenses to a firm to develop their embryonic products was specifically concerned with 
pharmaceuticals.  
  Clearly one sees in the case of the rise of pharmaceutical biotechnology the same kind 
of coevolution of physical and social technologies, and of supporting institutions, that I described 
earlier in the case of mass production industry in the United States, and of the dyestuff industry   25
in Germany.   But there are some interesting differences, particularly on the side of the social 
technologies that evolved. 
  The major innovations in firm and industry structure that marked the earlier cases – the 
rise of the large hierarchically organized firm and later the multi-divisional form in the Chandler 
case, and the industrial research laboratory tied to a company that planned itself to employ the 
inventions that came out of that lab in the Murmann case – over time were shown by experience 
to be generally economically productive and conducive of profitability for firms in the relevant 
lines of business. However, the new industrial structure that has grown up in biotech has not 
proved itself, at least not yet.  Despite being touted for over a quarter century as being a highly 
productive new way of organizing industrial research, biotech firms specializing in research, and 
aiming for profit through joint ventures or licensing agreements with pharmaceutical firms 
engaged in production and marketing, have with few exceptions failed to earn a profit. And 
university patenting of research results, as contrasted with placing these in the public domain, 
has been shown to have some problematic aspects. 
  It is interesting, and I think relevant, that the notion that a firm could be profitable simply 
by doing research, and without having close organizational linkages to production and 
marketing, gained enthusiastic credence so readily. This proposition was inconsistent with the 
history of industrial research that was recounted above, where firms making and selling 
products learned the advantages of doing R and D internally. While there were a few 
exceptions, by and large firms that tried to make profit by specializing in R and D were not 
successful. Regarding the present case, it has been recognized widely for some time that most 
biotech firms who have specialized in research, and have not moved themselves into production 
and marketing, are not making any money. However, until relatively recently this problem has 
been treated as something that time would cure, and not an indication that the business plans 
and expectations involved in this structure possibly were not viable, except in quite special 
circumstances. Recently there has been more recognition of this possibility. Gary Pisano’s new 
book (2006) makes this argument forcefully. And while a number of important drugs have come 
out of the new regime, the flow has been far less than some enthusiasts had forecasted, and in 
addition there are signs recently of a slowing down of the flow. 
In any case, if in fact the research structure that has evolved in biotech potentially is 
highly productive, but there are still some bugs to iron out, learning certainly has been very 
slow. If in fact this is not a good way to organize industrial research, it is taking a long time to 
learn that.    26
  There also are good reasons to be open minded or even skeptical about the economic 
value, and more generally of the wisdom, of the new policies encouraging universities to patent 
what they can out of what comes out of their research, an institutional development that, while 
not tied to biotech, has been exercised especially vigorously in this field. There has been a long 
history of debate about whether it is appropriate for universities to patent their research results 
when they can, or rather simply place these in the public domain. Since the end of World War II, 
when the Federal Government became the dominant funder of academic research, much of the 
debate has been concerned with the patenting of results coming out of government funded 
research. It seems fair to say that, until the testimony and deliberations that led to Bayh-Dole, 
there was widespread belief that scientific findings would be most productive if placed in the 
public domain. And when the research in question was funded publicly, there was no need for a 
patent incentive to induce the work. 
  The argument that carried the day for Bayh-Dole was that technology transfer would be 
more strongly motivated if university researchers held a patent on their research findings, and 
companies who needed to make significant investments on their own to “commercialize” those 
results could be assured by the grant of an exclusive patent license that their profits would not 
be quickly eroded by competition. However, the evidence for this argument was not extensive. 
It is clear that since the 1970s many important new products and processes have been 
made possible by academic research. Over this period, university patenting has increased 
greatly, as has university revenues from technology licensing. These facts have led some 
sophisticated observers to argue that Bayh-Dole has amply met its goals. Thus in 2002 the 
Economist opined that “possibly the most inspired piece of legislation in America over the past 
half-century was the Bayh-Dole act of 1980.” 
However, the enthusiasts for Bayh-Dole generally have suffered from an historical 
myopia. University research was contributing importantly to industrial innovation long before 
Bayh-Dole and much of what industry was drawing on was in the public domain, not patented.  
Bayh-Dole was brought into a university research system that already was strongly oriented to 
spurring innovation, and quite successful at it. Thus it is not clear that the new university 
patenting has been as important in facilitating technology transfer as the advocates have 
claimed. Put another way, contrary to the message of the cite from the Economist, it is quite 
possible that much of the university contribution would have occurred without university patents.  
On the other hand, the downsides of Bayh-Dole, and the policies of universities to patent 
as much as they can, and earn as much money as they can from their patents, are now more 
visible than they were a few years back. (For a discussion see Nelson, 2004.) There are several   27
prominent cases where the licensing policy of a university has resulted in a strong monopoly 
position by a particular company. In at least one such case, a company who clearly was in the 
lead in developing the technology was effectively shut down by the company that had the 
exclusive license. In other cases, the holder of the license has blocked academic researchers 
working in a field. A recent court case has signaled clearly that the argument by academic 
institutions that, since they do basic research, they have a research exemption to any patent 
blockages is not persuasive in an era when universities themselves are major patenters, and 
use their patents aggressively. And the issue of possible bias in the articles and public 
statements of academics has been receiving increasing attention in the press.  
For all of these reasons, recently there has been some backing off from the enthusiasm 
for university patenting that marked the 1980s and 1990s. A recent issue of the Economist 
(2005) focused on many of the issues raised above, implicitly arguing that the costs of university 
patenting and often exclusive licensing needed to be weighed against the benefits. The National 
Institutes of Health have issued guidelines calling for its grantees to license their patented 
inventions widely not narrowly.  
It is uncertain whether on net Bayh-Dole; or rather the set of incentives and practices 
symbolized as well as reinforced by Bayh-Dole, has been a plus or a minus.  The uncertainty 
here, as the uncertainty regarding whether or not the advantages of specialized research firms 
in a field like biotechnology have been oversold, shows clearly how difficult it often is to evaluate 
new social technologies, and the institutions supporting them. Mistakes can be made, and can 
last a long time. 
 
VI. A  Reprise 
The thrust of my argument in this essay is two fold. First, economists are surely right in 
seeing “the right institutions” as the key to economic productivity and progressiveness. But 
second, if we are serious about taking the argument deeper we need to recognize that we have 
a very real challenge. The magnitude of the challenge, I think, is only beginning to be 
understood.  I read the recent writings of Douglass North (1999) and Thrainn Eggertsson (2005) 
as presenting a similar point of view. 
Indications of the intellectual challenge come into view once one recognizes the large 
number of things distinguished economists, and other social scientists, have called institutions, 
at least if one continues to believe that, somehow, they all are talking about roughly the same 
thing. That thing, then, must be very complex and variegated. I have proposed that much of the 
writing on institutions is concerned with the factors that mold the behaviors of economic agents,   28
in contexts where the effectiveness of their actions depends on the behaviors of other economic 
agents.  Institutions influence the patterns of behavior that are prominent in a society, and what 
behaviors are deterred. The complexity and variegation are there because in most cases there 
are many different factors influencing economic behaviors, and the important ones vary across 
economic activities. More, given the wide range of human motivations and beliefs, and 
differences across traditions and cultures, the factors that can induce particular behavior 
patterns almost surely differ somewhat from context to context. 
If these arguments are accepted, it should be clear that the hunt for a single small set of 
institutions that are necessary, or sufficient, to support economic productivity and 
progressiveness is an unpromising quest. Economists, social scientists more generally, are not 
going to make much headway towards understanding the institutions needed for productivity 
and progressiveness if we look only at a macro economic level, or if we entertain only broad 
general conceptions like “support of market organization,” or respect for the rule of law, or 
democratic government. At the most, we may be able to identify a set of broad variables that 
seem to be associated, more often than not, with good economic performance, or their absence 
often associated with poor performance. But invariably there are going to be exceptions. 
Similarly, broad theoretical proposals about the nature of institutions, like that they are “the rules 
of the game,” or “governing structures,” or “habits of action and thought common to the 
generality of man” are not going to take us very far. The devil is in the details.  
And a major problem for research on institutions is that the relevant details, that is the 
details that make a consequential difference regarding the efficacy of action, often are hard to 
discern. This is at once a problem for positive research that seeks to explain why certain 
economies have done better than others, and a serious problem for normative analysis 
concerned with identifying the institutional reforms needed to improve productivity and 
progressiveness. 
Regarding the former problem, earlier I highlighted that perhaps analysts have misread 
what has been going on in American biotech, putting too positive a gloss on the institutional 
structure that has evolved. But for an example that has now played out, recall the recent history 
of attempts by analysts to explain why during the 1970s and 1980s the Japanese industry was 
doing so well, in competition with American and European, in automobiles and then electronics. 
Remember the sequence of explanations that today seem rather quaint, or at least at odds with 
the new conventional wisdom: government guidance under MITI, life time employment, long-
term financial relationships between banks and firms, cooperative R and D.  I am not arguing 
here that there is nothing to these proposed explanations; they well may have been an   29
important part of the story. Rather, my argument is that it is very hard to identify the key 
institutions that are behind economic success, and also that is important to recognize that what 
works well in one country in one era may work quite differently in a different country or as times 
change. This, of course, makes prescription especially difficult. 
The development of a solid understanding of how institutions affect economic 
productivity and progressiveness obviously is a very challenging task. The basic reason is that 
the relationships are not simple. But the going will be specially hard if economists do not 
develop a coherent and broadly agreed-upon way of thinking about what institutions are, and 
how they affect economic activity, that illuminates the complexities as well as the broad 
regularities. My central purpose in this essay has been to sketch out a perspective on 
institutions and economic change that does that.   30
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